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In several visual tasks, participants report that they feel confident about discrimination
responses at a level of stimulation at which they would report not seeing the stimulus.
How general and reliable is this effect? We compared subjective reports of discrimination
confidence and subjective reports of visibility in an orientation discrimination task with
varying stimulus contrast. Participants applied more liberal criteria for subjective reports
of discrimination confidence than for visibility. While reports of discrimination confidence
were more efficient in predicting trial accuracy than reports of visibility, only reports of
visibility but not confidence were associated with stimulus contrast in incorrect trials.
It is argued that the distinction between discrimination confidence and visibility can be
reconciled with both the partial awareness hypothesis and higher order thought theory.
We suggest that consciousness research would benefit from differentiating between
subjective reports of visibility and confidence.
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INTRODUCTION
In the field of consciousness research, two general approaches to measuring conscious awareness
are often distinguished: objective measures and subjective measures (Cheesman and Merikle, 1984;
Seth et al., 2008). While objective measures have dominated cognitive psychology for the second
half of the 20th century (Boring, 1953; Eriksen, 1960; Danziger, 1980), in more recent years,
more and more researchers from different theoretical perspectives argued for using subjective
measures in consciousness research (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dienes, 2004, 2008; Ramsøy
and Overgaard, 2004; Lau, 2008b; Dehaene, 2010; Timmermans and Cleeremans, 2015). A measure
of awareness is considered objective if conscious experiences are ascribed to the subject based on
performance in a task (Eriksen, 1960). In contrast, measures are deemed subjective if participants
are required to make a report about their conscious experiences (Cheesman and Merikle, 1984).
The main argument why objective measures should be accompanied by subjective measures relies
on the premise that conscious experiences are not necessarily in accordance with performance in
discrimination tasks (Lau, 2008b; Seth et al., 2008). On the one hand, there may be cases where
discrimination performance is above chance in absence of conscious awareness. The standard
example is blindsight, which is caused by lesions to primary visual cortex. These patients report
to be blind in the visual hemifield contralateral to the damaged brain area. Despite their apparent
blindness to stimuli presented in their visual field corresponding to the lesion, these patients
are able to perform well above chance in forced-choice tasks (Weiskrantz, 1986). On the other
hand, there may also be cases where conscious experience exceeds the manifest discrimination
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performance. For example, when participants are presented with
arrays of several letters, observers report they can see all or almost
all letters, but typically are able to report no more than 3 to 4 of the
letters (Sperling, 1960; Block, 2011). As a consequence, it is not
adequate to automatically assume an observer is aware whenever
performance is above chance.
When using subjective measures to assess conscious
awareness, it is crucial that the contents of subjective measures
match the contents of subjective experience relevant for a specific
research question (Rausch et al., 2015). At least two categories of
conscious contents can be considered: sensory and non-sensory
contents (Mangan, 2001): The standard examples of conscious
experience are most often sensory contents, e.g., the redness of
an apple. Sensory conscious contents are always tied to a specific
sensory modality. It is not necessary that a sensory conscious
content is in fact mediated by the corresponding sense organs;
e.g., a hallucinated voice is also a sensory conscious experience.
Many non-sensory experiences are related to processing quality
(Winkielman et al., 2015). Examples in the context of implicit
cognition are familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002), feeling-of-knowing
(Nelson, 1984), and rightness. Familiarity has been in the focus
of a considerable amount of memory research because familiarity
was proposed as a second process in addition to recollection of
details involved in recognition task (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a
review). However, rightness was argued to be the most important
non-sensory experience in implicit cognition (Mangan, 2001):
it was characterized as at once the core feeling of positive
evaluation, of coherence, of meaningfulness, and knowledge.
For example, in artificial grammar tasks, participants’ intuition
differentiated between correct and incorrect responses although
participants denied their response was based on memory or
knowledge (Dienes and Scott, 2005). In an artificial grammar
task, confidence ratings imposed more liberal criteria task than
subjective reports about grammar rule awareness (Wierzchon´
et al., 2012).
Is there empirical evidence for non-sensory experiences in
absence of visual awareness? Famous examples for dissociations
between sensory and non-sensory experiences stem from
conditions when the visual system is impaired: After lesions
to primary visual cortex, so-called blindsight patients report
to be blind in the visual field contralateral to the impaired
brain area, although they are able to discriminate visual stimuli
presented in their seemingly blind visual field in forced-choice
tasks with remarkable accuracy (Weiskrantz, 1986). In blindsight
type 2, patients report a form of awareness without content,
a feeling of something happening that is qualitately different
from normal seeing (Weiskrantz et al., 1995; Sahraie et al.,
2002). Some blindsight type 2 patients also report a considerable
degree of confidence that discrimination responses about stimuli
presented in their blind hemifield were correct (Sahraie et al.,
1998), and may even wager the same amount of money on
judgments on stimuli in the blind as in the intact hemifield when
the objective difficulty of judgments is balanced (Persaud et al.,
2011). Confidence ratings and wagering normally depend on all
conscious content the observer considers relevant for making a
discrimination judgment (Dienes, 2008); however, when type 2
blindsight patients at the same time report that sensory conscious
contents are absent, confidence, and wagering are more probably
based on non-sensory conscious contents. A similar pattern as
type 2 blindsight can be observed when neural activity in occipital
cortex was only transiently disrupted via transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS): Occipital TMS between 86 and 114 ms after
stimulus onset suppressed visibility of the stimulus. Nevertheless,
performance in orientation and color discrimination tasks was
still quite accurate, and discrimination confidence was strongly
correlated with performance in these tasks (Boyer et al., 2005).
However, there is an on-going controversy whether the
conscious contents underlying type 2 blindsight qualify as
sensory or not (Foley and Kentridge, 2015). On the one hand, the
residual perceptual abilities of blindsight patients may indicate
that the conscious experiences of blindsight type 2 patients is too
fragmented to qualify as visual awareness (Kentridge, 2015). On
the other hand, it was argued that type 2 blindsight should be
considered as visual (and thus sensory) because it meets objective
criteria for vision. The physical stimuli that caused the experience
are photons and the sense organs that mediate the experience
are the same as in normal vision, namely photons and the eyes
(Foley, 2014). According to this view, blindsight patients report
non-sensory experience without sensory experience because their
reports are not always reliable (Foley, 2014). Indeed, there is
evidence that at least some blindsight patients do report some
visual experience when carefully queried (Overgaard et al., 2008;
Ffytche and Zeki, 2011). Similar to blindsight type 2, there is a
case of an achromatic patient, who reports color blindness after
occipital brain damage but performs well in color discrimination
tasks, and his confidence in being correct in the task strongly
correlates with task performance (Carota and Calabrese, 2013).
Again, it is controversial whether the performance of achromatic
patients occurs in complete absence of color experiences or is
mediated by residual conscious contents of color (Heywood et al.,
1998).
Is there empirical evidence for non-sensory experiences in
absence of visual awareness in observers without neurological
impairment? When observers were asked to categorize their
experience during a psychophysical experiment, the majority
of participants ended up with four categories. While the first
category indicated the absence of all experience, the second was
described as a non-sensory experience, “a feeling of something
being shown, not characterized by any content” (Ramsøy and
Overgaard, 2004, p. 12). The third and the fourth category involve
both sensory experiences of the stimulus as well as confidence
in the discrimination judgment. This categorization developed
by participants was named Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS).
Although many researchers have referred to the PAS as a direct
measure of visual experience, it is important to note that the PAS
assesses both sensory as well as non-sensory conscious contents.
Other studies have directly compared subjective reports of
visibility against a measure indicative of non-sensory experience.
In a masked digit discrimination task, participants were able
to detect their own discrimination errors in trials where they
also reported the masked target digit was not visible (Charles
et al., 2013, 2014). Similarly, participants were more liberal
to report confidence in being correct in the discrimination
task than to report visibility in a masked localization task
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(Schlagbauer et al., 2012), as well as a masked orientation
discrimination task, a masked shape discrimination task, and
a random dot motion discrimination task (Zehetleitner and
Rausch, 2013). In the latter three experiments, discrimination
confidence consistently outperformed subjective reports of
visibility in predicting discrimination accuracy (Zehetleitner
and Rausch, 2013; Rausch et al., 2015). Two other studies
found different relationships between confidence ratings and
the PAS: In a masked object classification task, PAS ratings
imposed more liberal minimal criteria than confidence ratings,
and the PAS outperformed confidence in predicting accuracy
(Sandberg et al., 2010). In a masked face discrimination task,
confidence was only more predictive of trial accuracy when
the confidence rating was presented before the discrimination
judgment; the relationship reversed when the order of task
and rating was exchanged (Wierzchon´ et al., 2014). As the
PAS is explicitly intended to measure both visual experiences
as well as conscious contents that qualify as non-sensory
(Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004), the PAS might outperform other
scales in predicting accuracy because it assesses both visual
experience as well as feelings of confidence. However, there
may be various other explanations for the discrepant results;
specifically, it was proposed that the PAS is specifically suited
to measure awareness of simple visual stimuli (Sandberg et al.,
2013). As a consequence, the question arises whether the effect
of confidence and visibility as contents of subjective reports
generalizes to other stimulus material. In addition, considering
both doubts about the reliability of reports in type 2 blindsight
as well as the inconsistent results of previous studies, it appears
necessary to test how robust the effect of confidence vs. visibility
occurs.
The present study was conducted to test if the effect of
confidence and visibility as content of subjective reports on
criteria and the relation between reports and accuracy is
replicable and generalizes to a low contrast discrimination task.
To ensure that subjective reports of visibility and discrimination
confidence were based on the same amount of sensory evidence
and the same discrimination bias, we required participants
to report visibility as well as confidence in each single trial.
Collecting two subjective reports per single trial may have two
disadvantages. First, the first subjective report might influence
the following second report. In addition, the second subjective
report may increase the task demand, interfering with observers’
ability to monitor their own experiences or performance.
However, as we balance the order of the visibility and confidence
ratings across participants, potential effects of order or task
demand should be orthogonal to the effect of interest for the
purpose of the present study. We provided participants with
feedback about incorrect discrimination judgments after their
subjective reports to maintain consistency with existing studies
on discrimination confidence (Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010;
Moran et al., 2015) and our own previous study (Zehetleitner
and Rausch, 2013). Moreover, to investigate the relation to
the quality of stimulation, we varied the contrast of the
target stimulus. We compared five statistics between visibility
and confidence: average reports, the probability of reporting
confidence and visibility conditioned on the other report within
the same trial, meta-da as measure of the degree to which
subjective reports differentiate between correct and incorrect
trials independent of criteria (i.e., metacognitive sensitivity;
Maniscalco and Lau, 2012), metacognitive bias quantifying
how liberal or conservative the criteria were, and gamma
correlations with contrast levels to assess whether subjective
reports differentiate between different levels of quality of
stimulation. As both the presence as well as the absence of effects
are relevant for the present research question, Bayes factors are
used to test hypotheses, which provide a continuous measure
of how the evidence supports the alternative hypothesis over
the null hypothesis and vice versa (Rouder et al., 2009; Dienes,
2011).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty participants (four male, all right handed) took part in
the experiment. The age of the participants ranged between
20 and 30 years, with a mean age of 23.9. All participants
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no history of
neuropsychological or psychiatric disorders and no psychoactive
medication. Participants gave written informed consent and
received either course credits or €8 per hour for participation.
The study protocol was approved by the ethics committee of the
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The stimuli were presented on a ViewSonic Graphics Series
G90fB CRT monitor with 19 inch screen size and at a refresh rate
of 80 Hz placed in a distance of approximately 60 cm in front
of the participant, located in a sound-attenuated and electrically
shielded cabin.
The experiment was conducted using a Dell Precision T3400
PC with Windows XP, MATLAB 7.2, and Psychtoolbox (Brainard,
1997; Pelli, 1997). The target stimulus was either a circle
(diameter: 0.2◦ of visual angle) or a square (size: 0.2◦ × 0.2◦)
textured with a binary grating. The lighter and darker luminance
of the grating varied randomly across trials, resulting in six
different levels of luminance contrasts: 0% (uniform stimulus
luminance at 38.2 cd/m2), 2.2% (39.0 vs. 37.3 cd/m2), 3.9%
(39.5/36.5 cd/m2), 5.0% (40.0 vs. 36.2 cd/m2), 5.5% (40.2 vs.
36.0 cd/m2), and 6.9% (41.1 vs. 35.8 cd/m2). The orientation of
the texture was either horizontal or vertical and randomly varied
across trials. The target stimulus was always presented at fixation
in front of a gray (35.5 cd/m2) background.
Participants responded to the orientation task by pressing
“A” or “S” on the keyboard with their left hands and made
subjective reports on a continuous visual analog scale on a Cyborg
V1 joystick (Cyborg Gaming, UK). Joysticks were previously
observed to be a decent method to record subjective measures
(Rausch and Zehetleitner, 2014).
Trial Structure
As can be seen from Figure 1, each trial began with the
presentation of a fixation cross at the screen center for 1,000 ms.
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FIGURE 1 | Trial structure.
Then, the target was presented for a fixed period of time of
200 ms, until it was replaced by a blank screen. The blank
screen remained until participants had indicated whether the
orientation of the grating had been horizontal or vertical. To
prevent premature responses, there was a period of 600 ms
after the stimulus when participants could not yet respond
to the stimulus. Immediately afterward, two subjective scales
were presented one after the other. For each subjective scale,
a question was displayed on the screen, with a continuous
rating scale presented underneath the question. For visibility, the
question was “how clearly did you see the grating?” with the two
anchors “unclear” and “clear.” For discrimination confidence, the
question was “how confident are you that your response was
correct?” with the anchors “unsure” and “sure.” Subjects always
responded to both questions after each trial. The order of the two
questions was counterbalanced across subjects. If the response to
the task had been erroneous, “error” was displayed on the screen
for 1,000 ms after the last subjective report, before the next trial
started.
Design and Procedure
Participants were instructed to report the orientation of the
grating, their visual experience, and their confidence as accurately
as possible without time pressure. The experiment consisted of
a training block and nine experimental blocks of 42 trials each.
In each block, every contrast value was presented seven times
in random order. After each block, the percentage of errors
was displayed to provide participants with feedback about their
accuracy.
Data Analysis
All analyses were conducted using the free software R 3.1.1. (R
Core Team, 2014).
Metacognitive sensitivity, the degree to which subjective
reports discriminate between correct and incorrect trials was
quantified by meta-da (Maniscalco and Lau, 2012) using an
implementation in the R (Rausch et al., 2015). Meta-da is
expressed in units of discrimination sensitivity da, allowing a
direct comparison between meta-da and da. The continuous
subjective reports were discretized into 13 bins for the
computation of meta-da (the same number of bins as in Rausch
et al., 2015). Metacognitive bias was computed based on the meta-
da algorithm as the average distance of rating criteria to the
discrimination criterion on the decision axis assumed by the ideal
observer signal detection model (Maniscalco and Lau, 2012). The
correlation between subjective reports and stimulus contrast was
assessed by ordinal Gamma correlation coefficients.
To analyze the probability of reporting visibility and
confidence conditioned on the other report in the same trial
without inflation of the number of conditions, subjective reports
were dichotomized. As can be seen from Supplementary Figure 1,
in trials when the stimulus was absent, most subjective reports fell
below approximately 25% of the scale range, which we used as a
cutoff to divide the continuous subjective reports. Visibility below
25% had been used as cutoff in previous studies as well (Del Cul
et al., 2007).
Hypothesis testing was performed by Bayesian mixed linear
regression models with default fixed-variance priors (Rouder
and Morey, 2012) based on the R package Bayes Factor (Morey
and Rouder, 2015). Separate models were fitted with average
report, metacognitive sensitivity, metacognitive bias, and the
correlation between reports and contrast as dependent variables
and a random effect of participant on the intercept. Each model
involved the predictors scale (visibility vs. confidence), and
scale order (visibility first vs. confidence first); contrast and
squared contrast centered to its mean were tested for average
report, metacognitive sensitivity, and metacognitive bias; and
trial accuracy (correct vs. incorrect) was included into the models
predicting average reports and the correlation between reports
and contrast. In addition, we also tested the interactions between
scale and each of the other factors. To obtain Bayes factors
for each effect, the marginal likelihoods of the model involving
all effects was divided by the marginal likelihood of the model
where the effect to be tested was dropped from the model. As
priors, scaled inverse-chi-square priors on g-parameters were
assumed (see Rouder and Morey, 2012, for the detailed model
specification), using a scale parameter of
√
2/2 for discrete
predictors (scale, scale order, accuracy), and 0.5 for continuous
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predictors (contrast, squared contrast). This choice of scale
parameters reflects the equivalent of the default prior for the
alternative hypothesis recommended for psychology (Rouder
et al., 2009). As measure of effect size, we computed1R2 between
the full model and the abridged model using the R libraries lme4
(Bates et al., 2014) and MuMIn (Nakagawa and Schielzeth, 2013;
Barton, 2014). To compare meta-da and da, and to compare
conditioned probabilities, a series of Bayesian t-tests based on
a default Cauchy prior with a scale parameter of 1 was used
(Rouder et al., 2009).
RESULTS
To facilitate reproduction of the present study and replication of
its results (Ince et al., 2012; Morin et al., 2012; Simonsohn, 2013),
the data and the analysis script were made available at the Open
Science Framework1.
Descriptive Statistics
Mean discrimination accuracy was 49.4% (SEM = 1.2) at the
minimum contrast of 0 and 97.6% (SEM = 0.7) at the maximum
contrast of 6.9%. Participants’ confidence in the correctness of
the preceding discrimination response was 25.3% (SEM = 4.4)
of the width of the visual analog scale at the minimum contrast
and 92.4% (SEM = 2.5) at the maximum contrast. Likewise,
participants reported an average degree of visibility of 13.6%
(SEM = 3.6) at the contrast of 0 and 72.7% (SEM = 4.0) at the
contrast of 6.9%.
Average Reports
Average reports as a function of scale, scale order, and
contrast can be seen in Figure 2. The data of single
participants is found in Supplementary Figure 2. The Bayesian
regression analysis indicated very strong evidence for effects
of scale, BF10 = 2.4 × 1014, 1R2 = 0.06, accuracy,
BF10 = 4.5 × 1031, 1R2 = 0.12, contrast as a linear predictor:
BF10 = 1.2 × 1056, 1R2 = 0.25, and contrast as a quadratic
predictor: BF10 = 2.8 × 108, 1R2 = 0.03. The evidence for
an interaction between scale and accuracy was not conclusive,
BF10 = 2.3. For the other effects, the Bayes factor provided
varying degrees of evidence for the absence of the effect: The
support of the H0 was strong for the interactions between scale
and linear contrast, BF10 = 0.098. The evidence for the H0 was
positive for the effect of scale order, BF10 = 0.28, as well as for the
interactions between scale and quadratic contrast, BF10 = 0.24.
Finally, the evidence against an interaction between scale and
scale order was not conclusive, BF10 = 0.40.
Conditioned Probabilities
The distribution of subjective reports of visibility in trials
when participants’ confidence was less than 25% of the scale
range and the corresponding distribution of confidence in
trials when visibility was below 25% are depicted in Figure 3.
The distribution of visibility and confidence as a function of
1https://osf.io/vk6fe/
other ranges of the second subjective report can be found in
Supplementary Figures 3 and 4. Importantly, in trials when
confidence was below 25% of the scale, visibility was also below
25% in 96.2% of trials. In trials when visibility was below 25%
of the scale, confidence fell in the same range in only 61.7%.
A Bayes factor indicated there was strong evidence that the
probabilities of confidence and visibility below 25% conditioned
on the other subjective report falling below 25% were not the
same, BF10 = 138.5. Likewise, when participants reported that
their discrimination confidence was above 25% of the scale,
participants reported that the visibility was at least 25% in
98.0% of trials. In contrast, when participants reported that their
confidence was at least 25%, they also reported that their visibility
fell in the same range in only in 75.9%. A Bayes factor indicated
very strong evidence that the probabilities of a report above
25% conditioned on the other report above 25% were different,
BF10 = 3.3× 103.
Metacognitive Sensitivity
Meta-da was smaller when subjective reports were about
visibility, M = 0.5, SEM = 0.1, compared to meta-da computed
from discrimination confidence, M = 1.2, SEM = 0.1, and
compared to da, M = 1.1, SEM = 0.04, which measures
objective discrimination performance on the same scale as meta-
da. As can be seen from Figure 4, the effect of visibility vs.
confidence on meta-da emerged already at the contrast of 1.6%.
In addition, metacognitive sensitivity of both scales appeared
to be slightly smaller when they preceded the other scale. The
Bayesian regression analysis indicated very strong evidence for
effects of scale, BF10 = 1.2 × 1019, 1R2 = 0.12, contrast as a
linear predictor, BF10 = 2.7 × 1052, 1R2 = 0.47, contrast as a
quadratic predictor: BF10 = 1.3 × 108, 1R2 = 0.05, as well as an
interaction between scale and linear contrast, BF10 = 1.2 × 109,
1R2 = 0.05. In contrast, the Bayes factors indicated strongly that
there was no interaction between scale and quadratic contrast,
BF10 = 0.079, and provided some evidence that there was no
effect of scale order, BF10 = 0.26. Finally, the evidence concerning
an interaction between scale and scale order was not conclusive,
BF10 = 2.8. To explore this potential interaction, we performed
separate analyses for each order of subjective reports. Effects of
scale were observed both when visibility preceded confidence,
BF10 = 3.2 × 1016, and vice versa, BF10 = 4.2 × 106. However,
the magnitude of the effect appeared to be increased when
participants reported visibility first, 1R2 = 0.18, compared to
1R2 = 0.07 with the opposite order.
A series of direct comparisons between metacognitive
sensitivity as expressed in meta-da and the corresponding
measure of discrimination performance da can be found in
Table 1. We observed that meta-da as computed from visibility
ratings was lower than what would be expected from da starting
from a contrast level of 3.9%. In contrast, meta-da computed from
confidence ratings was greater than da at contrast levels of 5.5 and
6.9%.
Metacognitive Bias
Participants were always more liberal in reporting their
confidence in being correct in the discrimination task than
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FIGURE 2 | (Upper) Mean discrimination performance as a function of stimulus contrast and scale order (visibility first vs. confidence first, in separate columns).
(Lower) Mean subjective reports as a function of trial accuracy (correct vs. incorrect trials, in separate rows), scale order (visibility first vs. confidence first, in separate
columns), stimulus contrast (on the x-axis), and scale (visibility vs. confidence, in different colors). Errors bars⇔ 1 SEM.
in reporting their subjective visibility of the stimulus except
trials where contrast was maximal and the response was
incorrect. The estimated distance of second order criteria to
the discrimination criterion was smaller when subjective reports
were about discrimination confidence, M = 0.8, SEM = 0.4,
compared to when reports where about visibility, M = 1.3,
SEM = 0.5. The Bayesian regression analysis revealed very strong
evidence for effects of scale, BF10 = 1.1 × 1024, 1R2 = 0.12,
and contrast, linear trend: BF10 = 8.2 × 1057, 1R2 = 0.43,
quadratic trend: 3.3 × 106, 1R2 = 0.03, and positive evidence
for an interaction between scale and scale order, BF10 = 5.8,
1R2 = 0.01. There was also substantial evidence against the effect
of scale order, BF10 = 0.33, as well as against the interaction
between scale and contrast, linear trend: BF10 = 0.16, quadratic
trend: BF10 = 0.21. To resolve the interaction between scale
and scale order, we performed separate analyses for each order
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FIGURE 3 | Distribution of visibility (Left) and confidence (Right) in trials when the other subjective report in the same trial fell below 25% of the scale
range.
of subjective reports. Effects of scale were observed both when
visibility preceded confidence, BF10 = 3.2× 1016, and vice versa,
BF10 = 4.2 × 106. However, the magnitude of the effect was
increased when participants reported visibility first, 1R2 = 0.18,
compared to the opposite order,1R2 = 0.07 (see Figure 5).
Correlation between Subjective Reports
and Stimulus Contrast
As can be seen from Figure 6, the average gamma correlation
coefficients between subjective reports and contrast was nearly
the same when the discrimination response was correct, visibility:
M = 0.68, SEM = 0.02, confidence: M = 0.72, SEM = 0.03.
However, when the discrimination response was incorrect,
visibility was still associated with contrast, M= 0.20, SEM= 0.06,
while the correlation between confidence and contrast was close
to being absent, M = 0.05, SEM = 0.03. The Bayesian regression
analysis indicated very strong evidence for an effect of accuracy,
BF10 = 1.0× 1025,1R2 = 0.71, as well as positive evidence for an
interaction between scale and accuracy, BF10 = 6.5, 1R2 = 0.02.
Moreover, the Bayes factors suggested no effect of scale order,
BF10 = 0.31, and no interaction between scale and scale order,
BF10= 0.27. Finally, the evidence was not conclusive for the effect
of scale, BF10 = 0.62. To examine the interaction between scale
and accuracy, we performed separate analyses for correct and
incorrect trials. While there was positive evidence for an effect
of scale when trials were incorrect, BF10 = 3.9, 1R2 = 0.09,
the evidence was not conclusive when the trial was correct,
BF10 = 2.0.
DISCUSSION
The present study was conducted to investigate subjective
reports of visibility and discrimination confidence during a
low-contrast discrimination task. We observed that participants
FIGURE 4 | Discrimination sensitivity and metacognitive sensitivity as a function of scale order (visibility first vs. confidence first, in separate panels)
and contrast (on the x-axis). Metacognitive sensitivity of visibility and confidence is depicted in different colors. Errors bars⇔ 1 SEM.
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TABLE 1 | Direct comparison between metacognitive sensitivity and discrimination performance.
Contrast level [%] Discrimination performance da Visibility meta-da Confidence meta-da
M SEM M SEM BF10 M SEM BF10
0.0 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.2 −0.09 0.06 0.3
2.2 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.2 0.13 0.07 0.2
3.9 0.88 0.08 0.10 0.11 774.4 0.68 0.09 1.4
5.0 1.55 0.07 0.36 0.16 8015.9 1.57 0.13 0.2
5.5 1.83 0.04 0.95 0.21 104.6 2.30 0.14 31.6
6.9 1.94 0.03 1.31 0.20 7.9 2.56 0.13 718.7
Bayes factors compare da and meta-da.
reported to be confident about the discrimination response being
correct although they reported no visibility of the stimulus
from time to time, but they hardly ever reported visibility in
absence of discrimination confidence. Moreover, discrimination
confidence was more efficient in predicting trial accuracy than
visibility was. The analysis of metacognitive bias suggested
that participants applied more conservative criteria for visibility
compared to discrimination confidence. Finally, both visibility
and confidence were associated with contrast in correct trials.
However, only visibility was positively related to stimulus
contrast in erroneous trials, indicating that participants were
able to differentiate between lower and higher stimulus contrasts
even in trials when they were not able to differentiate between
correct and incorrect orientations. These effects of visibility
vs. discrimination confidence were qualitatively the same no
matter which report was made first; however, the effect on
metacognitive bias was increased when visibility was reported
before confidence.
Should We Trust Participants about
Feelings of Confidence at No Visibility?
The pattern of participants reporting confidence in being
correct without visibility observed in the present paradigm
raises the question whether participants “really” experience
confidence without visual experiences, or whether they only
report confidence more liberally than visibility. For blindsight
type 2, it was argued that many blindsight patients experience
some residual visual phenomenology despite their reports
of being blind (Foley, 2014). In particular, under certain
circumstances, some blindsight patients have reported to
experience visual conscious contents (Overgaard et al., 2008;
Ffytche and Zeki, 2011). As first-person experiences can never
be observed from the third-person perspective (Nagel, 1974;
Jackson, 1982), nobody can conclusively rule out participants
having visual experiences without reporting them. Nevertheless,
it seems rather odd why participants would readily acknowledge
feelings of rightness while being reluctant to admit visual
contents. Moreover, the present pattern of confidence without
visibility seems to be reasonably robust as it was replicated
in patients (Sahraie et al., 1998; Carota and Calabrese,
2013) and healthy human observers in a range of tasks
(Schlagbauer et al., 2012; Charles et al., 2013; Zehetleitner
and Rausch, 2013). Finally, the analysis of metacognitive
sensitivity suggests that the effect of confidence and visibility
as contents of subjective reports is not exhausted by criterion
setting. While future research on the relation of sensory and
non-sensory conscious contents is clearly important, it seems
appropriate to start reflecting upon the implications of such a
distinction.
FIGURE 5 | Mean metacognitive bias as a function of scale order (visibility first vs. confidence first, in separate panels), contrast (on the x-axis), and
scale (visibility vs. confidence, in different colors). Greater values indicate a more conservative reporting strategy. Errors bars⇔ 1 SEM.
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FIGURE 6 | Mean gamma correlation coefficients between subjective reports and contrast as a function of scale (visibility vs. confidence, in different
colors), scale order (visibility first vs. confidence first, in separate columns), and trial accuracy (correct vs. incorrect trials, in separate rows). Errors
bars⇔ 1 SEM.
Implications for Theories of
Consciousness
Is the dissociation between subjective reports of visibility
and discrimination confidence consistent with the existing
theories of consciousness? In the following, we discuss whether
such a distinction can be integrated into three of most
influential concepts of conscious awareness for contemporary
research:
(i) Global workspace theory (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Baars, 2002, 2005)
(ii) Higher-order theory (Carruthers, 2011; Lau and Rosenthal,
2011; Timmermans et al., 2012)
(iii) Phenomenal consciousness (Block, 2002).
Can global workspace theory account for distinction between
visibility and confidence? Global workspace theory assumes
that representations encapsulated in specialized brain systems
are unconscious. These representations can be made available
to multiple brain systems via the global workspace. The
global availability of representations through the workspace
is subjectively experienced as a conscious state (Dehaene and
Naccache, 2001; Baars, 2002). An important tenet of global
workspace theory is that conscious access is all-or-nothing
(Dehaene et al., 2003). Conscious access depends on a cerebral
“ignition” where neural activity spreads from sensory cortical
areas to frontal and parietal areas, making perceptual contents
available to multiple cognitive functions. If global ignition does
not occur, perceptual contents are not available for report
(Dehaene et al., 2006). How can the binary characteristic of
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the global workspace be reconciled with the intermediate state
where participants report some confidence in being correct in the
discrimination task about the stimulus, but report no visibility of
the stimulus?
One possibility to explain the visibility/confidence distinction
within the framework of the global workspace is in terms
of the partial awareness hypothesis (Kouider et al., 2010). It
assumes that a stimulus is represented by a hierarchy of features,
with low-level features at the bottom and increasingly complex
features at the top. Separate features can be consciously accessed
independently from the other features. Partial awareness is a
state where some of the features of a stimulus are consciously
accessible but others features are missing. If participants are in
a state of partial awareness, conscious access to the task-relevant
stimulus feature may be sufficient for reporting confidence about
the discrimination response (Dienes, 2004, 2008). Moreover, a
state of partial awareness may be insufficient to create a coherent
visual working memory representation which may be strongly
involved in subjective reports of visibility. Conscious visual
working memory representations are not dependent on feature-
specific mechanisms (Bona et al., 2013). Alternatively, a report
about visibility may require conscious access to a greater number
of stimulus features (Rausch et al., 2015). After all, a striking
feature of consciousness is the so-called unity of experiences:
Humans do not experience color, shape, location, etc., of a
stimulus as separate; instead, the conscious experience of the
separate features of a stimulus seems to be integrated to one
visual object (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003). The partial awareness
hypothesis elegantly explains further details of the present results:
If task-irrelevant stimulus features contribute only to subjective
reports of visibility, they would not as efficient in predicting
trial accuracy as confidence ratings. In addition, it explains why
visibility is associated with contrast in incorrect trials, because
access to task-irrelevant features is more likely at higher contrast
even when the task-relevant feature is not available.
A second explanation is based on unconscious evidence
accumulation. According to this theory, subliminal stimuli
possess sufficient energy to evoke a wave of activity in feed-
forward wave of activation in specialized processors, but
insufficient energy to trigger global neural activity necessary
for reports of visibility (Dehaene et al., 2006; Dehaene, 2010).
This unconscious feedforward sweep may even reach higher
areas, thereby leading to above chance performance as well as
error detection in the absence of consciousness (Charles et al.,
2013, 2014). If confidence can be generated by the unconscious
feedforward sweep, it be explained why the condition to report
confidence is more frequently fulfilled than the condition to
report visibility. However, one aspect of the data fits slightly
better to the partial awareness hypothesis: If dissociations
between visibility and confidence were only due to unconscious
feedforward processing, the maximal difference between visibility
and confidence would be expected at intermediate contrast
levels. At lower contrasts, feedforward processing would often be
not sufficiently strong to reach higher areas, and consequently
participants would report no confidence and no visibility. At
higher contrasts, the processing would be strong enough to
trigger a global workspace most of the time, and participants
would consequently report confidence as well as visibility.
A maximal discrepancy between visibility and confidence at
medium contrast levels predicts an interaction effect in the
regression analysis between scale and a quadratic effect of
contrast. Squared centered contrast is maximal when contrast is
either lowest or strongest, and minimal at intermediate contrast
levels. Consequently, the interaction effect between scale and
quadratic contrast would be strong if the effects of scale were the
same at lowest and strongest contrast levels, and if the effects
of scale at the extreme contrast levels were different from the
effect of scale at intermediate contrast levels. In the present data,
there was always evidence against such an interaction, indicating
that unconscious evidence accumulation does not explain all
characteristics of the difference between visibility and confidence.
According to higher-order theories of consciousness, a
mental state of an observer is conscious if the mental state is
accompanied by a higher-order mental state that represents the
observer as being in a particular mental state (Carruthers, 2011;
Lau and Rosenthal, 2011; Timmermans et al., 2012). According to
different flavors of higher-order consciousness, this higher order
mental state can be a thought (Rosenthal, 1986), a percept (Lycan,
2004), or a statistical inference (Lau, 2008a). In the framework
of higher-order theories, subjective reports about visibility
indicate whether participants possess a higher order mental
state about seeing the stimulus, while discrimination confidence
demonstrate higher order mental states about discrimination
performance. Consequently, the present data suggests that there
can be higher-order states about discrimination performance
without higher-order states about perception: Participants know
that they have responded correctly, but they do not know that
they have seen the stimulus.
Are higher-order states about discrimination performance
without higher-order states perception consistent with higher
order theories? At first glance, it may seem they are not:
Higher order theories strongly emphasize the link between
consciousness and metacognition (Rosenthal, 2000). Under
the assumption that subjective reports of visibility do not
depend on metacognition, confidence in task accuracy without
visibility of the stimulus undermines the strong link between
consciousness and metacognition and thus one of the core tenets
of higher-order theories (Charles et al., 2013, 2014). However,
the assumption is controversial: Both subjective reports about
visibility and confidence require metacognitive processes with
the only difference that subjective measures about visibility
require metacognition of visual perception, not discrimination
performance (Zehetleitner and Rausch, 2013). Consistent with
this, subjective reports about visibility are associated with neural
activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) as suggested by
fMRI (Lau and Passingham, 2006) and theta-burst TMS studies
(Rounis et al., 2010). The dlPFC is a brain region closely related
to metacognition (Fleming et al., 2010; Fleming and Dolan, 2012).
Overall, the proposition that confidence in absence of visibility
indicates consciousness without metacognition appears rather
difficult to defend.
What mechanism can account for the occurrence of
higher-order states about discrimination performance without
higher-order states about perception? The first two proposals
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both assume that confidence requires additional metacognitive
processes. First, the metacognitive process specific to confidence
may be an unconscious error monitoring system (Charles
et al., 2013, 2014). This error monitoring process could
be informed by perceptual processes too weak to trigger
higher-order thoughts about perception, thus explaining why
participants report confidence in being correct but do not report
a visibility of the stimulus. In line with this view, metacognitive
sensitivity calculated from confidence was greater than expected
from discrimination sensitivity at higher contrasts, which may
suggest that error monitoring processes may be involved in
discrimination confidence. It is possible that error detection
contributes to visibility as well (cf. Wierzchon´ et al., 2014),
but this contribution could be modest or overlaid by noise,
which is why metacognitive sensitivity of visibility increases
only moderately at higher contrasts, and remains smaller than
expected from discrimination performance. Nevertheless, the
present data is fully compatible with error monitoring exclusively
involved in confidence.
The second proposal suggests that subjective reports about
visibility are generated by a simple metacognitive process of
monitoring one’s experience. Confidence is thought to stem
from a more complex metacognitive process that relates the
output of the first metacognitive process to one’s accuracy in
the task (Overgaard and Sandberg, 2012). This theory predicts
that higher order thoughts about discrimination performance
are conditioned on higher-order thoughts about perception of
the stimulus. While this view was developed to explain the
data of a previous study (Sandberg et al., 2010), in the present
data, confidence is not conditioned on visibility; in fact, the
criterion of discrimination confidence is lower, not higher than
the criterion of visibility. In addition, metacognitive sensitivity
of confidence was greater than of visibility, suggesting that
confidence does not require a more complex judgment than
visibility does.
According to a third proposal, many participants may engage
in mental imagery to visualize the appearance of the stimulus in
order report visibility. The ability of mental imagery is reduced
by dynamic visual noise (Bona et al., 2013). If discrimination
confidence requires less mental imagery than visibility and if
there was noise in the system, mental imagery could explain why
participants acquired more frequently and more precise higher
order states about discrimination performance than higher-
order states about perception, explaining both the difference in
criteria and metacognitive sensitivity. Notably, none of these
three proposals explains the pattern of correlation with stimulus
contrast.
The final possibility is a variant of the partial awareness
hypothesis framed within a higher order framework (see above):
Partial awareness is a state where some features of the stimulus
are globally accessible while others remain inaccessible (Kouider
et al., 2010). Global access allows a great variety of cognitive
systems to make use of the perceptual information (Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001; Baars, 2002); one of the cognitive functions
enabled by global access could be metacognition. Consequently,
in a state of partial awareness where the task-relevant feature
is accessible, participants may be able to form a higher order
thought about discrimination performance and thus report being
confident. However, other features of the stimulus may be
inaccessible and so participants lack a higher order thought
about perception and report no visibility accordingly. Such a
higher-order framing of the partial awareness hypothesis has
the same explanatory power as the original partial awareness
hypothesis with respect to criteria, metacognitive sensitivities,
and correlations with stimulus contrast.
Finally, is confidence without visibility consistent with the
theory of phenomenal consciousness (Block, 2002)? Conscious
awareness in the sense of phenomenal consciousness is
defined as what-it-is-like to have an experience of an external
stimulus or inner events (Nagel, 1974; Chalmers, 1994; Block,
2002). It is often critically discussed whether it makes sense
to interpret participants’ subjective reports as evidence for
participants’ private subjective experience (Dennett, 2007; Cohen
and Dennett, 2011). To explore potential implications of our
data, let us assume for now that when participants report a
specific experience, it can be reasonably assumed that another
human being would experience something similar in the same
situation (see, e.g., Velmans, 2000, 2007). What could be the
experience underlying participants’ reports of confidence when
they do not report a visible stimulus? One possibility is that
the phenomenology of participants that report discrimination
confidence but no visual experience is rightness, the core feeling
of positive evaluation, coherence, and meaningfulness (Mangan,
2001). Another possibility is the also non-sensory feeling-of-
knowing: Participants have the experience that they know
what the stimulus feature is, but the stimulus does not create
visual phenomenology. Feeling-of-knowing has been originally
described in the context of metamemory (Nelson and Narens,
1990; Koriat, 2007), but subliminal perception may be able to
generate feelings-of-knowing as well (Mangan, 2001). The final
possibility is a state similar to blindsight type 2: Their residual
phenomenology is characterized by the awareness of the event,
but without the phenomenology of normal seeing (Zeki and
Ffytche, 1998; Sahraie et al., 2002). Normal observers may have
a similar experience if the stimuli are just at the threshold of
conscious perception (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004).
There is one specific thesis about phenomenal consciousness
that at first glance appears to be at odds with the current data:
According to the overflow hypothesis, the contents of short-
term sensory buffers are associated with phenomenal experience
(Block, 2011). This short-term sensory buffer stores all visual
objects for a short period of time, until it is overridden by the next
stimulation. However, participants are only able to make correct
discrimination judgments about 4± 1 objects, as cognitive access
to the contents of sensory buffers is limited by the capacity of
working memory (Sligte et al., 2008; Vandenbroucke et al., 2011).
As the capacity of the conscious sensory buffer is much larger
than the capacity of working memory, the overflow hypothesis
explains why participants are only able to make correct task
responses about a small number of display items, although they
report an experience of a rich phenomenal world (Block, 2011).
The standard and widely debated case is that phenomenal
consciousness exceeds cognitive access. In present data, the
relation between visual consciousness and access appears to
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be the other way round: Participants report to be confident
more often than they report visibility. Conscious access is a
requirement for all subjective measures, as they require that
neural systems engaged in decision making and language need
to receive inputs from perceptual processes. However, although
participants had conscious access when they reported they
felt confident about task response, they reported no conscious
visual experience. A similar pattern was reported from a patient
suffering from achromatopsia (Carota and Calabrese, 2013):
After bilateral temporal–occipital lesions, that patient reports
to be color-blind although he performs accurately in a color
recognition task. A potential explanation why the relation
between phenomenal consciousness and conscious access varies
is the number of items in the display: Visual short-term
memory always used arrays of multiple stimuli. In contrast, the
present studies always presented one stimulus at the screen at
fixation. Consequently, phenomenal consciousness may overflow
cognitive access only for stimuli outside of the focus of attention,
while at the focus of attention, conscious access occurs more
frequently than phenomenal experience.
Implications for Mathematical Models of
Subjective Reports
The present data may also be informative for mathematical
models of subjective reports. Many key results can be explained
in terms of signal detection theory (SDT). In particular, the
analysis of metacognitive bias suggested that discrimination
confidence is associated with rating criteria closer to the
discrimination criterion. Likewise, the lower metacognitive
sensitivity of visibility compared to confidence may be formally
described by criterion jitter (Ko and Lau, 2012) or by decreasing
signal (Barrett et al., 2013).
However, there are two aspects of the present data may posit a
challenge to SDT and other models of discrimination confidence:
First, many models imply that there is a positive correlation
between confidence and stimulus contrast in correct trials and a
negative correlation between confidence and stimulus contrast in
incorrect trials (Kepecs et al., 2008; Moran et al., 2015). However,
there was no association between confidence and contrast in
incorrect trials and the relation between visibility and contrast
was just reversed to what would be expected from standard
SDT. Moreover, metacognitive bias decreased with increasing
stimulus contrast, suggesting that participants lowered their
criteria when stimulus quality was high. As stimulus contrast
varied randomly from trial to trial, participants lowered their
criteria based on their percept of the stimulus in the current
trial. A possible explanation for this pattern of results is that
participants might not exclusively consider the evidence when
making a subjective report, but at least subjective reports of
visibility may reflect heuristic computations of the magnitude of
sensory data (Aitchison et al., 2015). Nevertheless, our paradigm
was not designed to test SDT models; in particular, as both
visibility and confidence reports were placed within single trials,
it is possible that the absence of a negative correlation between
stimulus contrast and discrimination confidence in incorrect
trials is due to an interaction between confidence and the
visibility rating. Future studies appear necessary to substantiate
this result.
Second, metacognitive sensitivity calculated from
discrimination confidence was greater than expected from
discrimination performance at higher contrasts, indicating
that subjective reports of confidence were based on more
evidence than discrimination responses (Barrett et al., 2013).
A potential explanation would be that evidence continues
to be accumulated even after the discrimination response
(Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010; Moran et al., 2015; Murphy et al.,
2015).
Implications for Measuring Conscious
Awareness
It is widely assumed in the field of consciousness research that
subjective reports of visibility and discrimination confidence
are equally valid, and thus typically used and/or interpreted
as interchangeable (Seth et al., 2008; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011;
Ko and Lau, 2012). As subjective reports of visibility and
discrimination confidence are associated with different criteria
and metacognitive sensitivities, the present experiment implies
in accordance with some previous studies that subjective reports
of visibility and confidence should not be considered a priori as
equivalent measures of conscious awareness (Charles et al., 2013;
Zehetleitner and Rausch, 2013; Rausch et al., 2015).
This is relevant for a series of studies that compared
different subjective measures with the aim to identify appropriate
scales to measure conscious awareness (Dienes and Seth, 2010;
Sandberg et al., 2010, 2011; Wierzchon´ et al., 2012, 2014;
Szczepanowski et al., 2013; Rausch and Zehetleitner, 2014). This
research program rests on the assumption that the scales under
comparison are equally valid from a conceptual point of view, but
some of these scales have better empirical properties than others.
For example, some scales may correlate more strongly with task
performance indicating that these are more sensitive measures
of awareness (Overgaard and Sandberg, 2012). Alternatively, all
scales may be sensitive to the same continuum of awareness,
but different scale measure different ranges of the unawareness-
awareness spectrum (Wierzchon´ et al., 2012).
In contrast to the assumption of equal validity of confidence
and visibility, we suggest whenever experiments suggest visibility
and confidence do not converge to the same results, researchers
need to consider carefully which conscious contents are relevant
for their specific research question, and choose the content of
their subjective measure accordingly: Some studies investigate
the visual experience of a specific stimulus feature, e.g., studies
investigating the neural correlate of experiencing “red” when
seeing a red apple. In this case, participants should report their
conscious experience of this particular feature. If participants
were asked about their confidence in a task instead, there would
be a risk that participants had just an intuition of being correct
without visual experience, resulting in false positives (Rausch
et al., 2015). In contrast, if a study is about all conscious contents
underlying performance in a specific task, participants should
report their confidence in being correct as subjective reports of
visibility may lead to misses in this case (Dienes, 2004, 2008). If all
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conscious contents are relevant, researchers may want to consider
if it is feasible to use several measures with different contents.
However, it is an open empirical question what is the set of
experimental paradigms where discrimination confidence and
visibility dissociate. The present paradigm differed from standard
studies of implicit cognition in several aspects: Participants
received feedback, two subjective reports were collected per
single trial, the scale minima were labeled as “unsure” or
“unclear” instead of “guessing” or “unseen,” and the reports were
collected using visual analog scales and joysticks. Of course,
the suitability of scales for studying implicit cognition is tested
more rigorously when the paradigm is representative for the
kind of experiments where subjective measures are commonly
used. When discrimination confidence was compared to the
PAS in more standard no-feedback, between-subject designs,
the PAS was associated with greater metacognitive sensitivity
than discrimination confidence (Sandberg et al., 2010; Wierzchon´
et al., 2014). However, the PAS was designed to measure both
visual contents as well as several non-sensory experiences and
is consequently not a measure of visual experience only. Future
studies appear necessary to investigate whether the effect of
confidence vs. visibility as content of subjective measures on
criteria and metacognitive sensitivity generalizes to between-
subject designs without feedback, but with one report per trial,
four category scales and standard scale labels.
CONCLUSION
The effect of visual experience and discrimination performance
as content of subjective reports on criteria and metacognitive
sensitivity generalizes to a low contrast orientation task. We
argue that the effect is consistent with the partial awareness
hypothesis as well as higher-order theories of consciousness, but
the observed pattern is just reversed to the overflow hypothesis of
phenomenal consciousness.
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